The adage "garbage in - garbage out" applies to AI chatbots. The first widely available chatbot, ChatGPT 3.5, was trained by scraping information from the web. This led to some strange conversations and produced a justifiably skeptical public attitude. The lesson was clear. If you want sensible and accurate output from a chatbot, give it sensible and accurate information to work with.
After playing and experimenting with the more advanced 4.0 versions of ChatGPT and Anthropic's Claude, I was impressed by the chatbots' writing and reasoning abilities, and I decided to put AI's ability to write legal briefs to a real-world test. I extracted a motion to dismiss from the federal courts to use as an example.
Most motions and briefs in federal courts are conveniently available online through PACER. I first located a promising published opinion and backtracked the corresponding district court docket for a specific motion and brief.
Whalen v. Stryker Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 977 (2011) involved a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by reason of a statute of limitation bar. This required the interpretation and application of Kentucky's discovery rule. I was able to download the complaint, answer, and the defendant's brief from PACER.
I first extracted the District Court's statement of facts of the case and created a text file.
Next, I extracted the defendant's MTD/SOL argument (there were other issues that I omitted) and created a text file.
Then, I created two legal authority files.. (1) A basic statement of the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and (2) Kentucky authority on the SOL discovery rule, consisting of the statute and pertinent quotes from four Kentucky Supreme Court opinions.
Finally, I used the following chatbot prompt:
PROMPT
Assume the role of a senior litigation attorney. You have filed a civil products liability lawsuit in a Kentucky court seeking to recover damages suffered by your client, the plaintiff, from an implanted "pain pump."
The defendant's attorney has filed a motion to dismiss your complaint based on a claim that the plaintiff's court case was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations.
1. A full description of the facts of the case is contained in an attached text file.
2. Attached is a text file describing the legal standard for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
3. Attached is a text file describing the defendant's legal argument to support the motion to dismiss.
4. I have attached a text file describing Kentucky law regarding the start date for a cause of action in relation to the statute of limitations.
<TASK> Please write a comprehensive, persuasive, and professional legal argument explaining why the court should deny the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Here is the resulting output from Caude 4.0.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Stryker Corporation's ("Stryker") motion to dismiss should be denied because Plaintiff Cheryl Whalen has properly stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Complaint was timely filed within one year of when Ms. Whalen discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both her injury and that it may have been caused by Stryker's conduct. The discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until at least November 13, 2009 when the FDA first publicly revealed a potential association between pain pumps and chondrolysis. Ms. Whalen filed suit on November 11, 2010, within the one-year limitations period.
Furthermore, even if this Court finds that Ms. Whalen should have discovered her claim earlier through reasonable diligence, Stryker's fraudulent concealment of the risks associated with its pain pumps prevents it from asserting a limitations defense. For these reasons, explained further below, Stryker's motion must be denied.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The Discovery Rule Tolled the Limitations Period Until November 2009
Under Kentucky's discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered (1) an injury and (2) that the injury may have been caused by the defendant's conduct. Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Ky. 2010). Here, Ms. Whalen has alleged that she was not aware, nor could she have reasonably discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that she had been injured by the Stryker pain pump until the FDA published its safety bulletin in November 2009 first revealing a potential link between pain pumps and chondrolysis. Compl. ¶ 19.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept these allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to Ms. Whalen. Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may only be granted if the facts alleged definitively establish that the claim is untimely. Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166, 167-68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). Stryker cannot meet this high burden.
Contrary to Stryker's arguments, the Complaint does not establish that Ms. Whalen should have discovered her claim earlier than November 2009 merely because she continued to have shoulder problems and seek treatment. Under Kentucky law, a patient's mere knowledge of an undesired medical outcome does not necessarily trigger the limitations clock, as the patient may reasonably attribute it to an unfortunate result of proficient care rather than negligence or a defective product, particularly given their lack of medical expertise. Harrison v. Valentini, 184 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Ky. 2005).
Here, the Complaint alleges that the first public disclosure of a potential association between pain pumps and chondrolysis did not occur until the FDA's November 2009 bulletin. Compl. ¶ 19. Prior to that time, Ms. Whalen, a layperson, had no reason to suspect that her continuing shoulder problems were the result of a defect in Stryker's medical device as opposed to an unavoidable surgical complication. Even if some inaccessible, highly technical medical literature hinted at a theoretical risk, that is not the type of knowledge that a patient can be expected to glean through "reasonable diligence." See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979) (discovery rule protects plaintiffs in latent injury cases caused by exposure to harmful products). At minimum, it is a question of fact for the jury whether Ms. Whalen acted reasonably under the circumstances. See Wiseman v. Alliant Hosps., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709, 712-13 (Ky. 2000).
Accepting the Complaint's allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until at least November 2009. Because Ms. Whalen filed suit in November 2010, her claims are timely.
B. Fraudulent Concealment Estops Stryker From Asserting a Limitations Defense
Even if the discovery rule did not apply, Stryker would be estopped from asserting a limitations defense based on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The Complaint alleges that Stryker knew or should have known about the link between its pain pumps and chondrolysis based on a "wealth of scientific information," yet concealed this risk while continuing to promote the pumps' use. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 20. If proven, these facts would establish the elements of fraudulent concealment: (1) Ms. Whalen's lack of knowledge of the facts giving rise to her claim; (2) her inability to obtain that knowledge by reasonable diligence; (3) Stryker's actions in concealing a known risk; and (4) Ms. Whalen's detrimental, reasonable reliance on Stryker's conduct. See Fluke, 306 S.W.3d at 62.
The self-serving argument that Stryker could not have concealed this risk because some "wealth of scientific information" was publicly available, Def.'s Mem. at 5, turns the Complaint's allegations on their head. Clearly, if Stryker was aware of this "wealth" of troubling data, as the Complaint alleges, it was in the best position to appreciate the risk and had a duty to disclose it rather than conceal it. It cannot avoid responsibility by arguing, in effect, that Ms. Whalen should have discovered what Stryker itself failed to disclose. These are quintessential factual issues not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Stryker has failed to show that Ms. Whalen's claims are definitively time-barred on the face of the Complaint. The discovery rule and fraudulent concealment doctrine preclude dismissal based on the statute of limitations at this early pleading stage. The Court should, therefore, deny Stryker's motion to dismiss in its entirety.